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The Zero Option

A Protocol for Survival Beyond the Fila

In this text, the names of certain actors operating within the ZÉRO-system have been omitted in accordance with regulatory requirements. However, for those who possess the RECON optics, this is of no consequence: names are merely temporary masks; the functions remain unchanged

Annotation: RECON — The Blueprint of the Upstart

In an era defined by the “ZÉRO-System” — a global architecture of noise, control, and administrative queues — the individual is increasingly reduced to a mere “interface” or “phantom.” RECON is not just a book; it is a diagnostic tool and an operational manual for those who refuse to be consumed by the “informational GMOs” of the 21st century.

This manuscript maps the global battlefield of 2026–2035, deconstructing the competing models of global management:

The Museum: BRICS and the illusion of conservative safety.

The Fair: The USA and the inflation of prestige and noise.

The Factory: China’s attempt to industrialize human talent.

The Bazaar: India’s fractal competition for survival.

RECON introduces the archetype of the “Upstart-Architect” — the individual who possesses the “optics” to see the underlying structures of power rather than the superficial content of the “queue.” It provides a rigorous protocol for “cognitive fasting” and the construction of Small Dense Networks (SDNs) — parallel, autonomous structures built on trust, real-world assets, and structural capability, rather than fiat currency or digital reputation.

Drawing on a deep socio-anthropological glossary, the book exposes how the “conservative code” of the masses perpetually recreates hierarchies that stifle talent. RECON offers a path out of this erosion: a strategy of distance, invisibility, and the creation of “fog-based” autonomous enclaves.

This is a manifesto for the builders of the next cycle. It is an engineering task for those who have realized that there is nowhere left to run, and that the only remaining path is to plant a new forest on scorched earth.

RECON: Stop waiting for permission. Start building the structure.

Chapter 1 Nothing Sacred — A Multitude of Traitors

If one out of ten aspirants becomes wealthy, it rarely sparks alarm. Envy, perhaps. But if the newly rich are also fools, it quickly dissolves any residual anxiety.

If the most worthy among ten aspirants is chosen, the remaining nine will seethe with regret. Their vanity will consume them. But if they choose the weakest among them, everyone breathes a sigh of relief.

Thus, history is dictated not by the envy of material wealth, but by vanity. To foster a truly worthy world government, the vanity of billions must be silenced, rather than invoking the tired specter of class struggle.

The vanity of billions… Why is this critical to our current situation? We live in an era where everyone lives for money. Before money took precedence, society was governed by estates and lineages. For nearly 2,000 years, humanity relied on the “voice of blood” — not in the sense of nepotism (“this son of a bitch is our son of a bitch”), but in the sense of evolutionary selection. Noble blood. Worthy parents, carefully vetted by their own ancestors, could not produce unworthy offspring; even the weak among them upheld the code. The selection of a leader was a matter for elders or a council of authoritative figures.

This did not mean a leader could not fail. Circumstances were many. Yet, even 2,000 years ago, the selection of the weak or unworthy signaled a surrender to monetary interest and personal glory. A people could find themselves with a weak elite or a leader who surrounded himself with mediocrities.

What is the root cause of such a choice?

A prolonged absence of threat.

When the outcome in the short term does not depend on a random choice, those in power, unafraid and foolish, grow complacent and indulge their vanity. For instance, when Hannibal requested aid from Carthage, the envious detractors of the Barca clan responded with mockery: “You are winning regardless; why do you need help?” The result was tragic: Carthage vanished, and its people were sold into slavery.

The main conclusion: People seek help only in moments of extreme necessity. This moment is the “Point Zero.” Hannibal was recalled from exile too late.

For 2,000 years, humanity relied on the decisions of the wise. This was the age of estates, castes, and noble families. In conservative communities, money did not dictate outcomes — authority did. Two millennia later, after a series of revolutions, the authority not only of the estates but even of the revolutionaries themselves has evaporated. The liquidation of any authority is the final obstacle before the global crown of money. Even with local rulers, officials, and states in place, people understand these are mere formalities: the true government is elsewhere. The true rulers are those who possess the money. Local rulers depend on them.

Money has introduced globality while simultaneously stripping influence from any local sanctities. People have realized: money decides everything. Laws are drafted by the world of money. Therefore, for those who have acquired even a modicum of wealth, nothing is sacred. This is why we are surrounded by conditional traitors — both latent and potential.

Money penetrates human beings through opportunity.

All traitors emerge from conservative environments, where a hierarchy of authority exists from birth (even if diminished, the inertia of tradition remains; otherwise, all nations would have long since fractured). Communities consist not only of inexperienced youth but of elders. Parents and kin assist the young in maturing and finding their footing. One cannot simply escape this world.

But when conditions are created — especially when there is an urge to mask the “damage” of one’s origin through speculation, bribery, and fraud — everything becomes clear. Traditional worlds create a “line” (the Fila). This line can only be overcome through betrayal. Yet, in doing so, one can draw closer to the monetary throne of the invisible world elite.

— —

Chapter 2 Civil War: The Exit and Entry of Conservative Populations

Civil War: A Formal Definition

A civil war is a large-scale armed conflict within a single state between organized groups aiming to seize power in the center, capture specific regions, or alter the state’s political system.

Key Characteristics:

Internal Nature: The conflicting parties are citizens of the same country (nation), sharing the same “CODE.”

Ideological Schism: The war is fought not for territory per se, but for incompatible value systems, governance models, or resource allocation.

High Intensity: Involves mass participation of the civilian population and radicalization of society.

Erosion of the Monopoly on Violence: Central authority loses its exclusive right to use force, which shifts to paramilitary formations.

Result: A profound transformation of the social structure, a turnover of elites, and a long-term schism in national memory.

Population decline is not merely a product of global wars. The most conservative segments of society suffer the most during civil wars.

Beyond the formal definition, we must understand what a civil war actually is. Today, I will state truths not often heard in the open world.

The Bifurcation of Provincialism and Outsiders

For at least twenty years, we have been witnessing a bifurcation — a bifurcation of the “Outsider.” Later, this process was sponsored from the outside, utilizing the complexes of large masses.

But what was the starting point? Who became the sudden elite, and who was relegated to the “province”? The bifurcation began in 1991. When the USSR launched its “market reforms,” those closest to the decision-making centers became the masters of the new life. Mostly, these were the former Komsomol apparatchiks. They were partially from the old nomenklatura, partially from the ranks of the new “democrats.” As mentioned before, these lucky ones were born in the 50s and early 60s; they had spent their entire conscious lives amidst Soviet parades and anthems. They were the most “Soviet” people of all.

Because there were too many aspirants at the top (who did not reveal their true desires, masking them under the name of “reforms”), the breakup of the USSR along national lines was a political ploy by these factions. Yet, in the provinces, this ploy was not understood. Local Komsomol cadres did not grasp it (for a “true” Komsomol member, the center of the world was Red Square). The Soviet people were internationalists then — before privatization, greed had not yet fully taken hold.

By the 2000s, it became clear to everyone: people had grown bitter. They saw the “slices” of wealth held by others while clutching their own “scraps.” Bitterness grew against the nouveaux riches — the masters of life and the promised paradise.

And nationalism flourished. Why? Because the Komsomol elites themselves had pointed the way along national-administrative lines in 1991. Financial donors of chaos subsidized new activists throughout the 90s. Initially, nationalism was hidden behind a mask of “democracy,” but it eventually grew into an independent branch, fueled by the number of victims of “reform,” usurpation, and corruption. Constant, permanent advertising eroded every impressionable mind. Temptations poured in from all sides, fueling envy and malice.

The Second Phenomenon

No one has considered why nationalism surged on the periphery of the USSR (the former republics), while in the center of the former empire, a reciprocal chauvinism emerged. It happened because the former were historical “outsiders,” while the latter were the carriers of an imperial code.

Finally, what do we see as the result of these opposing poles meeting? Two factions of the “religion of money” colliding? The masters fight, and the servants suffer… No, it is much more complex than that.

Consider the Civil War of 1917–1921. Class struggle, as the Marxist-Leninist definition goes. But even in the White Army, there were peasants. Representatives of the same village shot at one another. In Artyom Vesely’s Russia Washed in Blood, a son consciously kills his father from across the trench after a brief dialogue. The father saw his career in serving the “master” of the old system; the son saw his career in the leap toward a “new freedom,” free from the routine of serving anyone.

The conclusion: a civil war is a clash not only of classes but of generations. Few understood what Communism or Marxism actually was.

The young “leapers” were later culled by the more modest Stalinists. The Stalinists knew best that revolution brings new opportunities. This is why modern provincial Kazakhs admire the portraits of young Ukrainian ministers: “Look,” they say, “there are no old people in power in Ukraine. We could have had that, too.” We could not. We only need to look in the mirror. The “European Dream” is not entirely ours. Our path will lead to fundamentalism, following the fanaticism of greedy outsiders. Remember? “People grow tired of fanaticism…” We will have the old men again, but in ritual robes. The bourgeoisie and the “upstarts” always want to dream of their youth and the youth of foreign ministers. No, we do not need that kind of youth.

In general, provincials are “outsiders” in a conservative environment (though not all, as the authoritarian regime promotes the obedient). In a market, provincials simply become fanatical about temptations. There are no restrictions, only the regimes of corrupt officials in front of them and the West at their backs. Hence the Maidans, one after another, and then the hegemony of the rural, the aul, the hut. Chaos. And the death of the conservative contingent.

What is the result?

That various philistines, peasants, and penny-pinchers follow ideas? Not exactly. But one must consider the physical side of the question. In a conservative environment, the majority mattered. Whoever had the numbers held the fate of the state. But after the dreams, everyone wants to eat. And the struggle begins.

This explains the certain “slowness” in the new conflict between outsider factions in this hybrid war. These new outsiders are literate, rational people. They weighed the risks and chose to gamble. They could have negotiated across the trenches. On the other hand, where they were gathered by force, many fled, and others are held against their will. (Who holds them by force? Those who have already felt themselves to be “Europeans” with the necessary pedigree.) And yet, while this bloody, irrational “battle of the outsiders” continues, the algorithms of the digital concentration camp are glitching. They cannot calculate a “mad” impulse or chauvinistic fanaticism. They are afraid of the conservative population.

— — —

Chapter 3 The Most Audacious — The Russian Elite. The Shelf-Life of Defiance

The beginning of the 21st century has demonstrated: there are no truly local elites left in the world. Even China, with its 3,500-year history of “waiting it out,” possesses no real authority. Neither the pressure of the Eternal Heaven nor the teachings of Confucius — nor the material interests of modern rulers (and the Chinese are the Jews of the East) — have ever allowed China to mount a global protest. All it has produced in 2,000 years in the way of dissent are local uprisings and the paradox of Zen Buddhism.

The Russians, however, are a different matter.

Although they insist with foaming mouths that they are not of the East but of the West — that they are the “Third Rome, and a fourth there shall not be” — this is demonstrably false. One need not be a scholar to observe the Russian elite and their behavior: it is a fusion of East and West, painted in the colors of Russian audacity. It was precisely the Russian elites who rebelled in 2022; no one else did.

All the global “outsiders,” together with local conservative outsiders, are looking in this direction: will Russia be able to withstand the combined strike of the West, or will it fail? What are these outsiders hoping for? Why do they fix their gaze upon the Russians?

Beginning with the COVID-vaccination operation, the world showed itself to be “dead.” Following lockdowns, the introduction of QR codes, and the mandate of vaccines, every ruler (every elite outsider) was in agreement. The digital concentration camp had acquired — or nearly acquired — the clear outlines of its completion.

And then, suddenly, a disruption. The “upstarts” (from the Western perspective) did not remain silent. Moreover, an ultimatum was issued to the West. (The Russian elites had already behaved strangely before this — by releasing their own vaccine. This meant they had created their own local score in a game meant for one: “We are playing with you, but we are playing by our own rules.”) This meant: “Yes, we have come to you and your pile of money, but we brought our own chairs. We will not sit in your money-castle where we are told to sit. And we will sail away on our own yachts, not yours.”

How are we to interpret this? Is this behavior Eastern or Western? They seem to play the money game and love money — that was clear throughout the 90s and beyond. They bought up real estate in the West, moved their families there, and kept massive sums in bank accounts. And yet: “We will sail away on our own yachts.” Is this not a shock to the masters of the world?

We have already learned what the “East” is through the example of China. China played the Western game and was prepared to keep its population in pre-prepared “containment zones.” No one wore masks longer than the Chinese. China’s financial games and those of the international financiers had penetrated too deeply into the Chinese economy. The Chinese emperors never prioritized their own population. China is interested only in its empire — even if as a financial Western subsidiary. China viewed the COVID war with the West as a “Third Opium War.”

The rest of the world — including Latin America and Africa — viewed this conflict as a continuation of the anti-colonial wars of the past. It resonates in their genetic memory. Therefore, anyone who stands against the colonizers, anyone who makes a stand at all, attracts outsiders with their sheer audacity. The global chamber has once again filled with the air of the mid-20th century.

We have already examined the internal motivation and the reason for the mass flight of the middle class: once a person acquires money, they no longer view local governments as their primary concern. Such people may possess their own “chairs” to sit in the hall of money — at the most despised positions, or even better, outside the hall itself. They watch the “money-mass” from hundreds of miles away and perform rituals through a screen. These people made their “Western choice.” Others did not. This became the cause of civil conflict. Now, what do we — the outsiders of the world — have before us?

We have two “domes” before our eyes.

One is beautiful, called the “Golden Cage.” Highly attractive, pleasant by habit, prestigious, and status-driven. Everyone who could use their own “chairs” to utilize this world does so without hesitation. Give me one day of this! In the Golden Cage, everything is pleasant. Even the end will be golden — prestigious.

The second dome is the “Dome of Audacity.” It is not as pleasant. It is not as comfortable. Within it, the silhouettes of the past are all too evident. People appearing to be the new boyars and feudal lords. Does this picture attract all outsiders? After all, audacity itself ceases to work over time. One needs a more charming picture of the future.

Hence the question: Can the audacious Russians offer a comprehensive alternative?

The world of money has become clear. It ends in a digital concentration camp. Without an alternative vision to the DIGITAL, nothing will succeed. All of this is temporary. The wearing of luxurious beards by the ideologues of the “audacious” does not inspire trust. Every BRICS nation has its own ancient faith. Uniting the old faiths of post-colonial peoples does not provide a single beard that fits everyone. Especially if the ideologues themselves drive foreign cars and wear Western brands.

— —

Chapter 4 “Yes, We are Alarics. Yes, We are the Camp”

…with slanted and greedy eyes.

What the Russians lack, what the Japanese have lost, only the Horde-born possess.

All nationalists play at antiquity. These games are adrenaline for the stifled and insecure. Behind these games lies the claim of the “senior” or “more cultured” party. In this sense, neither the Persians nor the Chinese fuss over such things — they have no such anxiety (and the Jews, naturally, are always present). The concern for “age” belongs to those who are insecure in themselves.

Moscow — The Third Rome.

Originating from Rome — what can be said against it? “Moscow is the Third Rome, and a fourth there shall not be.”

To understand this Roman series, to find the “Third Rome,” let us recall Alaric, the leader of the Visigoths. Indeed, after Alaric sacked Rome, the First Rome suffered great hardships and never fully regained its stature. Alaric was granted the title of Magister Militum, Roman gold, and lands for his people, but he did not know what to do with all this “Roman” junk.

As a true tribal man, he migrated from Rome back to the wild fields. Why? He acted as a nomad. Roman concrete and bricks meant nothing to him. A nomad has no need for paved streets. He needs freedom. He needs bright light and a familiar, natural landscape. Consequently, the Roman state, with its institutions and the Colosseum, frightened him.

He acted this way not out of idleness: pillage followed by retreat is tribal tactics, the strategy of the nomad. First the campaign, then the looting of the defeated, then a rapid retreat with the spoils to the native lands. After this, you are a hero. Beyond literal spoils for your kin, there is nothing here for a tribal person. They do not consume books; they find no use for what is written within them. Among all primordial peoples, laws are not inscribed on calfskin — they are remembered and recited. From childhood.

With the First Rome, everything becomes clear. Despite all their advanced logic, the Latins lost to barbarian passion and barbarian energy. Dry logic, mathematics, and legalistic stratification dehydrate a nation to the limit. In return, “culture” appears. For all their militancy, every savage on earth knows they are deeply lacking something. So, they don certain cloaks, assume expressions, and adopt poses — it is all posturing, a dance, but it has an effect on their brethren.

That is why the descendants of Alaric created the Holy Roman Empire in the 10th century. They decided that tribal strife was endless and that something had to be done. The dancing and mimicry became more akin to civilization. Thus, the Germans created their own “Third” Rome (a German Reich, because by then, the Eastern part of Rome — Byzantium — already existed).

So, who was truly the third? And how many Romes are there, after all? One thing is clear: all these Romes trace their pedigree to the Latin one. Lest anyone wonder where the Japanese came from, I simply remind you: civilization loses the battle to any new barbarians (if that civilization has been dehydrated and drained of life by overly demanding teachers).

Why the Alarics Vanished in Japan

The Japanese had no empire until they encountered European technology and received significant investment before the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905. Japan emerged from its islands to secure raw materials for its industry. But the Japanese Empire had a legend of the first emperor — the son of the goddess Amaterasu. This allowed Japanese nationalists to speak to the Chinese: “We, too, have 2,500 years of civilization.”

One cannot say the Japanese elite resembled nomads. Despite their capitalist drive for the material, the Japanese despised “upstarts.” There was no rule of “loot and take home.” If they took things home, that “home” was Japan. They observed the Code of Bushido in the name of the Emperor. (This is why corruption is generally weak in Japan.)

Even the nomads had Genghis Khan’s Yassa. But in those distant times, the unified Horde was associated with the leader. If there is a leader, we do not loot for ourselves — we take it “home.” If there is no leader, we carry everything into our own yurt.

The construction of the yurt and many autonomous yurts resembled mini-states within a state. Submitting to clan logic, the nomads could create a separate camp (stoybishche) alongside the royal one. For tribal democracy, this is normal. (Thus, when certain elites in the modern Empire of Money act autonomously, they show traits of free nomads, not of the Third Rome. They came, took what lay unattended, and carried it home — without asking you, because warriors are allowed such things. Then they came to the financiers and said: “We are making our own yachts, like yours; we are bringing our own chairs, and we will sit wherever we please.”)

So, what does this have to do with the Japanese?

After their defeat by America in 1945, the Japanese made an unprecedented leap into high technology (they had done this several times before, starting with the Meiji era). And they lost the final bit of energy that remained after the 250-year Tokugawa dictatorship. At this moment, Japan is in a deep recession. The Japanese do not buy goods; they sit on shelves. The Japanese do not start families, yet they work themselves to exhaustion. The nation is aging. They received European logic and rationality and combined it with their diligence and contemplation. Now, they have absolutely no Alarics left…

Who are the Alarics? Who was Alaric, the conqueror of Rome?

He came, he plundered, and he left for whence he came. He demonstrated the energy of a new camp. But he did not create a Second Rome. And all other Alarics who act like nomads will not create an autonomous entity either. They will create a Second, imitative Rome (in our case, a monetary copy).

“Yes, we are Alarics. Yes, we are the Camp. But unlike the Visigoths, we will not retreat into the wild field. We will turn this field into a Second Horde, where technology serves the Will, and not the other way around.”

— —

Chapter 5 The Gertrude Effect (Russian and Japanese): Watch Some Porn Sometimes

I have observed a specific phenomenon: when a mature individual, still confident in their capabilities, is dismissed or removed from their position under the guise of “forced retirement,” they begin to behave promiscuously — and I mean that quite literally.

To understand this tragedy, I suggest we all recall the sensation of betrayal. Friends, comrades, loved ones, and family betray us often. The most devastating blow is delivered by those we love, those to whom we are bound — those from whom we expect nothing but loyalty. And how do you react?

Why even ask?

People react to betrayal by their own with extreme pain. Some turn to drink; others, as I mentioned, succumb to debauchery — risking syphilis and worse — while others suffer heart attacks and other stress-induced ailments. But what is syphilis or any moral degradation compared to the heavy pain within? Nothing. Now, we can understand the primary archetypes at the level of nations (for nations consist of people) and how they react to the betrayal of trust.

The Gertrude Effect

In Hamlet, the Prince rages at his mother: “In the rank sweat of an enseamed bed, stewed in corruption, honeying and making love over the nasty sty!” His mother is cohabitating on the throne with her husband’s brother.

But why does she do it?

Sex releases a cocktail of oxytocin, endorphins, and dopamine — creating a chemical storm against melancholy and grief. It grounds the arousal from the cortex and the limbic system into the reptilian brain. The reptilian brain is the most “salvational” part. It tells us: life has not ended; life continues. From this, one can understand the promiscuity and debauchery of a person stripped of all life’s meaning — they voluntarily transform into a reptile. I propose we look at post-revolutionary “reptilian behavior” not as an isolated personal tragedy, but as a sum of all tragedies combined.

Anarchy and terror are nothing but smug, organized “reptilianism.” A ruler channels petty vanity into a single current and controls the “Gertrude Effect.” Because before, during, and especially after a revolution, there is an immense amount of grief — precisely because there was an immense amount of betrayal.

The question remains: why do people betray?

Revolution answers this directly: because “the last want to become the first” (Claudius wanted to be King, to possess the Kingdom, and Gertrude).

The last, indeed, wish to become the first. But the first also do not wish to become the last.

This is where the true hell of history begins.

Betrayal is not born of poverty. Not of hunger. Not of inequality.

Betrayal is born in the moment a person first feels: I deserve more than I have.

As long as a peasant considers himself a peasant, the empire stands. As long as a soldier considers himself a soldier, the army is invincible. As long as a student considers himself a student, knowledge lives. And any government is obligated to provide everyone with the means to fulfill their aspirations (within reason, rather than crushing dreams). Because the migration of the conservative population is possible, not just the “relocants.”

And the moment the voice of the small, inner Claudius proves stronger than memory, duty, and gratitude, betrayal begins. Then begins the debauchery and the “syphilis.” First, one betrays the person. Then the family. Then the estate. Then the country. And finally, under the beating drums of revolution, betrayal is re-baptized as “justice.”

Once, the Japanese followed the path of “reptilian democracy.” They suffered the betrayal of their own defeat. They made a leap in the 60s and 70s; instead of promiscuity, they chose workaholism. The Japanese are the best RECON-agents. They do not strive to “get above themselves” and do not clamor for better places. But they lack exactly what is needed: ambition.

— — — —

Chapter 6 Two Domes Above the Head (West or Russia with BRICS?)

The Evolution and Dualism of the “Struggle of Contradictions”

This is a very limited menu for a human being, leaving no room to escape the binary: either you are for the West (ostensibly liberal, in reality, a hyper-powerful digital trap), or you are for the East (ostensibly conservative, in reality, purely imitative due to the inherent weakness of “retired” Eastern elites).

Let us begin by clarifying the weakness of these Eastern elites.

For Eastern peoples, the primary concern is the demonstration of status. Status is projected through various channels: knowledge, self-assurance, the gait of one’s walk, and the cadence of one’s words. For the common man, status is signaled by material objects — most simply, by daily attire (with the most expensive suits reserved for high holidays and critical days).

All of this loses value once a “confident man” or a nobleman ages and retires. He may don robes embroidered with gold and wear all his medals — it will not restore his status or his posture. Thus, the highest metric of status for a conservative individual is power. Once power is lost, the “Eastern seal of nobility” vanishes. In essence, he becomes irrelevant. This explains the feverish pocket-lining among Eastern elites at the top and their pathological refusal to vacate their posts. Those who could only signal their status through attire pass by, and they are no longer bowed to with the same reverence.

The Western elite, conversely, has no need for constant costume changes or the permanent signaling of postures. They long ago found the ultimate aggregate of elitism: money. You can afford anything, even if no one notices you. Just demonstrate that you possess the capital, and everyone around will scurry to serve you. (The Jews were the first to understand this, which is why the Western model can be termed “Jewish.” Over centuries of living in diaspora, they understood the conservative merry-go-round. Upon retiring, they always retained their capital, or strived to acquire it, having distributed interest to the goyim. This is why the Western elite is filled, if not entirely composed, of financial thinkers. They may not frequent synagogues, but they certainly consider themselves “The Chosen.” The Protestants are still attempting to play this same game of “chosenness,” with some having successfully integrated into the world government.)

What Eastern elites lack is that specific confidence that the “Jew” does not need to justify. Eastern elites depend on their people, for their ascent to power relies on the masses (especially under so-called democracy, where the vanity of the post-conservative crowd is entirely controlled by fashion and brands). In this selection process, the wounded vanity of primitives who signal their status through their clothes plays the most vital role. Through a series of democratic and socialist revolutions, the most advanced post-conservative nations lost their natural elite. All that remained were the “costume-changers” — people just like everyone else, signaling status through the objects they wear.

Yet, Eastern rudiments remain. Therefore, the main dream of any costume-changer (the philistine) is to somehow attain power and savor it. This is precisely what distinguishes the Western dome from the Eastern one. Though the West is now full of such “clown” elites, it is increasingly difficult to dismiss leading European officials, much like their Eastern counterparts, because only at the very top can one generate serious wealth. Postures and costume changes no longer hold sway here.

As we can see, Eastern elites have a mandatory period of “Eastern maturation.” Therefore, the most advanced youth of the East desire to avoid this honorable Eastern old age, especially since many potential elders will never be anyone at all. It is better to care for oneself in advance: reach power through the Western clownishness of populism, or become a wealthy man. Hence, the mass cries of discontent and the Maidans. In words, the agitators are for the people; in reality, each thinks only of himself — of fleeing to the West, where honorable old age still exists (or at least existed before, as the West is a culture where all forecasts are made in advance).

The Zealot enters the space between the two domes.

That the Eastern dome imitates the Western one is no longer a secret. It is precisely there that Eastern elites deposit both their personal savings and state assets. It is through this financial aggregate that Eastern elites exist under the dome in the form of a nesting doll (matryoshka).

The Zealot enters this “nesting doll space” and gains room to maneuver. True leftists are left with no other choice. Let all other leftists chase the “dictatorship of the proletariat” — they are leftists, and thus, fools.

— —

Вот перевод седьмой главы. Этот текст завершает построение твоей методологии, разоблачая механизм превращения политической системы в шоу, управляемое “Третьим братом”.

Chapter 7 The “Zero” Variant

Before presenting this information, I recall the legend of Danko by Maxim Gorky: *"The people, joyous and full of hope, did not notice his death and did not see that Danko’s brave heart was still flaming beside his corpse. Only one cautious man noticed this, and, fearing something, stepped on the proud heart with his foot… And so, scattering into sparks, it went out…”*

And the second remark from director Ridley Scott: *"I think what it boils down to — what we’ve got today [are] the audiences who were brought up on these f***ing cell phones. The millennian do not ever want to be taught anything unless you are told it on the cell phone.”*

It is a grave error to believe that people always live at the peak of their spiritual capacity. In the absence of anxiety, danger, and fear, people live carefree, sloppy, and reckless lives. They need no one, and no one needs them. It was in approximately this state that nations entered the 21st century.

Was there no war for a long time? Did people lose their fear and their solidarity? Yes, that is true. But that is not the most important thing.

People have watched too many movies. They lived through the tragedies of past centuries long ago via Hollywood films (and with the advent of the Internet, people are already bored — they require “Overton Windows”). From long-standing, warless satiety and an oversaturation of bloody battle scenes, the crowd feels that nothing exists: no pain, no death — nothing at all — yet these things are very real. There is also the artificial American smile and the collective cries of “WOW!” — adopted from Africans, who in turn adopted it from chimpanzees. (When Russians shout “WOW!” at a show, it is strange. When Kazakhs shout “WOW!”? …)

The technical revolution has committed a terrible act: it has castrated rigorous selection. Previously, reflection was born in blood, war, and great disasters. Today, the “Refag Loop” (*el lazo refag*) has absorbed both the “Zeremid” and “Remid” zones, passing the baton of control from responsible, average individuals (the *Remids*) to the most superficial digital lumpenproletariat. When there is no danger, authority and responsibility transition to average people (who evoke neither jealousy nor envy). власть silently passes to the weak — to those who will trample Danko’s heart after emerging from the forest. And this is especially true when all information, including politics, has transitioned into a show.

The Mechanism of Creating Clown-Rulers

Stage 1: Simplification and the Selection of Fools (The Remid Loop): When a totalitarian or populist regime ages, the degrading nomenklatura of peasant stock (the Zeremids) begins to panic at the sight of talent, intellect, and passion. The law of “peasant democracy” is activated: “Let the fools go first; we are not envious.” The elite consciously destroys the Zealots and promotes the grayest, most obedient executors. The system is simplified to a “command-execution” scheme. As a result, commanders grow stupid, and the cadre degenerates.

Stage 2: The Injection of Digital “Flotagia” and the Arrival of the Smartphone: Into this dehydrated, dulled world, the technical revolution bursts. The smartphone appears — a tool for the instant acquisition of surrogate goods. The smartphone completely liquidates the need for long, passionate labor or revolutionary struggle. The square of rebellion and real intimacy are replaced by digital masturbation on social networks. The mass reflection of society drops to zero. The nation turns into an atomized herd of egoists.

Stage 3: The Demand for the Clown: Under conditions of the total dominance of the “Third Brother” (Liberal Globalism of the Refags), traditional institutions of power turn into scenery. “Zeremid” philistines with smartphones no longer need prophets, priests, or stern fathers of the nation. They are incapable of perceiving complex thought-forms. They need someone who will entertain them on gadget screens, flatter their petty egoism, and promise “freebies.”

Stage 4: Legitimation of Plunder: A glib swindler, a media personality — the Clown — enters the stage. He puts on a populist show, humbles himself before the crowd for several weeks, dances folk dances, and shouts the right slogans. The digital herd sees itself in him and joyfully chooses him as the leader of the jungle. But the Clown is merely a mask, behind which stands the Third Brother. As soon as the Clown occupies the throne, he begins to systematically, cynically, and long-term plunder the people in the interests of global Refags, until the entire structure collapses into a new feudal abyss.

Marx was very wrong when he said that the technical revolution would lead people to communism. Marx did not know tradition. But Almaz Braev grew up within it.

For a person to develop in the depth and breadth of their soul, mere “removal of alienation” is insufficient. If people leave production, it is not enough. People will leave production to blow up everything around them. Only danger and some modicum of fear awaken the soul. This is the moment Marx failed to account for: that he is opposed by a million years of biological evolution.

Chapter 8 The “Mice”

“The difference between animals and humans is that animals would never allow a fool to lead the herd. We are the only life form that can hand over the reins of power to the worst among us — the loudest, the most arrogant, the emptiest. No wolf follows a weak leader, and no lion submits to a coward.”

In the storms of revolution, under the thick fog, the “small man” is invisible. The “small man” is the kindling of revolution. This is true. But as he burns in the fire, this energy does not vanish. People scream that there are no “small men.” They are wrong. The small are unforgiving and vindictive. Their petty vanity works twenty-four hours a day. If you notice that the collective farm chairman is a fool and there is no harvest, that is precisely the work of collective “small vanity.” Small vanity does not take revenge on a specific person; it takes revenge on everyone, including itself. It chooses a leader so that no one has to work, so that no one teaches or pressures them. Small vanity fights against responsibility. What kind of answers can one expect? “He is just like us, so he won’t punish us.” A fool is a fool everywhere. But in Africa, they know: if you choose a fat chieftain, you lose to your neighbors in advance — and then you vanish, because behind the neighboring palms, they are already prepared for the attack.

This is not an isolated occurrence. It is a system. The beginning of the 21st century can be called the triumph of the “small.” The small, who choose the small.

What led to this “small” dictatorship?

Perhaps technical progress? The realization that group effort is no longer required. No feats are necessary. No iron will. A principled and convinced person only repels and frightens. Democracy has shown that even a dog can manage a system (dogs are already being elected mayors somewhere). A position is no longer a responsibility. It is silence; it is the tranquility of small vanity.

1. The Revolutionaries?

Revolutionaries who attempt to lance the next boil inevitably stir up the small, collective hive — a place where “the small” live, unwilling to burn or to answer. They have shown how one should live: if those at the top do not work, those at the bottom do not want to, either. Any idea requiring “faith” inevitably produces idiots. They imitate the top. If you swap them, nothing changes.

2. The “Universe 25” Experiment

American ethologist John Calhoun conducted the “Universe 25” experiment. He created a paradise for mice: food, water, and warmth. A perfect enclosure. No predators. The phase of explosive growth began. But then, the hierarchy broke down because the “alpha males” could no longer protect their harems (there were no threats). The “Beautiful Ones” appeared: a caste of mice that only ate, slept, and groomed themselves, refusing social bonds, reproduction, and fights. They were absolutely apathetic to the world. The population rapidly declined until it went extinct, even though the feeders were full.

In animals, the reptilian function is linked to danger — hunger, rivals, or predators. In humans, beyond biological needs, there are spiritual ones. But in what state has humanity reached the 21st century? There are quiet places on Earth. There are conflict zones. If there is no struggle for existence, it leads to social autism and biological extinction. Human “Universe 25” is the civilization where struggle has ceased.

3. How “Mouse-People” Live

Petty vanity finds its embodiment in democracy. Democracy is the peak of “small” dictatorship. Over centuries, they have gutted will, principles, and muscle. This resulted in a “tolerant” aesthetic. Mouse-people have lost the meaning of existence. These people were the most disciplined during COVID-19.

When danger is absent, degradation is inevitable. The selection process started by revolutionaries was continued through democratic rituals. Feudal castes were predators, yes — but they were useful predators. They did not allow “small fantasies” to take root at a low level. But after socialist revolutions, the revolutionaries themselves were destroyed. They replaced the code of honor with “conscience” and “equality,” thereby inviting small people to invent democratic substitutes. They invented nothing but surveillance and the dictatorship of the small.

Why does a modern “retiree” or “former official” dissolve so quickly into the crowd?

The Abolition of Castes: In a caste system, respect was tied to blood or a sacred function. Revolutionaries declared: “All are equal, capability and position decide everything.” In reality, this provided disrespect once one is out of office. Respect became functional: you are respected only as long as you are “at the apparatus.”

Retirement as “Social Euthanasia”: For a “dead” person, the apparatus is an exoskeleton. Without it, they are merely decrepit meat. Retirement is the moment the exoskeleton is taken away.

The Idiocy of “Non-negotiating Vanities”: The essence of the idiocy: revolutionaries and officials voluntarily accepted the rules by which they would be thrown into the trash heap the moment they ceased to be useful to the apparatus. They build this conveyor belt, sincerely believing, “I will be the exception, I will hold on.” And then the moment of retirement comes, and they realize they have not a drop of genuine respect — only the fear of subordinates, which evaporated instantly. There is no respect for a slave without a title.

Did the revolutionaries understand this? No. They were idealists.

— —

Chapter 9 How to Calm the Fear of Resignation and Restore Honor Through Self-Sufficiency

The abolition of estates had an inspiring revolutionary meaning. Due to their own slogans and the struggle against the regime, the revolutionaries could not claim privileges. They asserted, “We are the same as you — simple people.” They did not desire privileges, that is true, but they had no right to lose power. Yet power is a privilege; it is, in itself, an estate (even if purely functional: remove the position, and the privilege vanishes). From this stems the fear that became the post-revolutionary legacy. The “small people” consistently chose the weakest leaders from the list of candidates, which amplified this fear and eroded self-sufficiency.

What was the meaning of Lenin’s recommendation that a high-ranking official should earn the salary of a skilled worker? It was a grand act of self-abnegation and revolutionary humanism. Powerful leaders like Lenin could afford to drink carrot tea and wear boots with holes. But Lenin was addressing himself. He equated himself with the workers and former peasants dressed in overalls. This was a devaluation of intellectual and cultural potential. An intellectual professional is not equal to a factory-machine operator. The workers themselves understood this. It was necessary to replace the noble code with an “intelligentsia-revolutionary” code — to replace old personal integrity with a new standard. To ensure that the respect of the lower classes (the small people) was an extension of the official’s self-respect. Were you forgotten after your resignation? No matter! Take pride in your work. The gratitude of small people is small. Aquarium fish do not remember faces.

The feudal lords were human — hands, feet, heads — but they possessed something else. They had a code of caste, a code of a natural elite. Therefore, replacing the innate sense of superiority with an acquired principle of “the common cause” was a momentous task — perhaps the most important for the socialist formation. The revolution raised people without honor from the bottom. Wave after wave. Each new recruitment revealed monarchical rudiments. No official secretary desired to vacate his post.

One leader, who knew people from their darkest side because he was raised by the streets, unleashed unprecedented terror — not only against direct rivals, gifted natural talents, or educated idealists, but against his own kind. None of the Stalinist commissars — former peasant children — could breathe freely. They risked their lives and the lives of their loved ones for privileges. They risked themselves as functions of a great apparatus where they were merely the primary cogs. This state can be called “one day is mine.” In the name of fame and privilege, one can take risks. But with retirement, the risk vanished — and so did the attention of others.

Why do the “small people” still consider the very first secretary — the one who nurtured and then crushed his own nomenklatura — to be the strongest? Because there was no fear. Only before an abyss or a predator at the mouth of the cave do the “small” choose a strong leader. Without a threat to their lives, they group together and choose a weak or, at best, average leader — someone who can only manage to exit the cave.

All subsequent communist secretaries were products of an even more sophisticated “small” compromise. As if there were no country, no state, no empire — only a cave with peculiar monkeys. No responsibility for the future — only the personal interests of the Kremlin’s “gods.” Take any secretary; each one is more ridiculous than the last. And no one can explain why.

Small peasant vanity could not replace feudal honor. The feudal lords had not honor, but responsibility. A nobleman could not be ridiculous. A caricature of himself or a casual insult would result in a challenge to a duel. That is the code of a military corporation (where risk once existed).

And what do the “small” think when fate throws them to the very top?

They think exactly as they did when they were at the bottom. Power burdens them, yet it is pleasant because they are looked upon as icons. Who would want to leave? They never prepare for departure. They always resist the intrigues of their “small” surroundings. They never prepared themselves to be self-sufficient like the first revolutionaries who launched this “small” conveyor belt.

Playing with the lower classes is not just a revolutionary practice. In the West, a “small” market elite was created after a series of revolutions. Never forget money as the fastest way to rise above one’s peers.

In the conservative world, this path is much more complex. There are many conventions. Money is not always in first place. Because the majority is not prepared for “monetary honor” (where everything is honest, as in a brand-name firm), almost all these “small” people are ready to jump into power. Because the Russian revolutionaries taught them how to stir up the bottom to create a new “small” wave. If there were no officials before the revolution, but only parrots, the parrots will continue to mimic old habits by inertia, simultaneously mimicking the most fashionable things from the Western monetary world.

This all leads to the fact that playing with the conservative code is the most serious game of all. You can destroy the feudal elite, but the need to replace it will arise. The second, third, and even fourth parties will be worse than their predecessors. The first had no code, only the fear of losing their post. The fourth party has only money on its mind. Even great wealth provides no solace: the hands of the “small” are greedy, and they have no brake. Because there is no one left to tell the “small” the truth. The monetary world has created conditions where, even in the embryo, conservative peoples cannot have an elite. Only parrots. Only creators of a parallel dome. Those who have ambition only while they are at the top, at their post. And their ambition will extinguish once the post is gone. With great money, they naturally become figures of the Western monetary world — where “monetary respect” is the only thing that works.

— —

Chapter 10 The Russian and Chinese Variants

The Russian and Chinese Lines

Why do the Chinese not fear retirement? This is despite the fact that in the past, they were forbidden from wearing robes of certain colors or patterns, lest they “discredit” the authorities. My observations are filtered through the prism of revolution: the Xinhai Revolution of 1911 in China and the February/October events of 1917 in Russia.

The Qing Empire existed at the nadir of its semi-colonial existence, fragmented by foreign concessions. The Manchus created an empire, yet they fractured the territory along feudal lines — nomads remain nomads, even in a post-status state. Their nomadic reflection leads to fragmentation. The Han Chinese were a “flock of sheep” managed by militaristic shepherds. The Manchus ruled them for 270 years but never truly became “Chinese.”

Why did this Manchu-Han chimera endure so long? The Han were like sheep, while the Manchus were ambitious. Furthermore, the preceding Ming dynasty had left behind chaos (when the “children of cooks” hold power, chaos is inevitable). The Manchus left the Han to manage the middle and lower tiers, while they themselves formed the golden aristocratic core. “Zereths” (the small-minded) have no ideology other than quantity: nomads do not build a “bright future”; they build a pyramid of security for their clan. They simply multiply when possible. When their pyramid grew too large, it demanded that the Manchus become “Chinese” (bureaucrats, scholars). In that moment, they lost their “pure energy of quantity” and turned into Manchu “parrots.” They began copying Western military technologies, but little came of it.

While the Chinese continued their Confucian meritocracy, the Manchus felt like the guardians of a Confucian monastery. They hypocritically supported the cult of knowledge because the shenshi (scholar-officials) sought wisdom, not power. For a Chinese official, finding happiness through knowledge was more vital than gold was for the Russians. Even if Chinese officials took bribes, they did not degenerate into the Russian “bribe-taker” archetype, out of respect for wisdom: upon retirement, any official was supported by grateful relatives or countrymen. He was regarded as a sage, not a discard of the apparatus.

In China, the ideal is the Junzi (“Noble Man”). Even if an official is a careerist, he is forced to play the part of the “sage.” In this game of “high” values, he is compelled to observe boundaries. Stealing “beyond measure” was not just a crime; it was a descent into “barbarism.” It preserved the system from total entropy.

Russian Intellectuals as a Foreign Body